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Stop Repeating History:
The Story of an Amicus Brief
and Its Lessons for Engaging in
Strategic Advocacy, Coalition
Building, and Education
Robert S. Chang,†Alice Hsu,†† Robert A. Johnson,†††
Elizabeth C. Rosen†††† & Sofie Syed†††††
When Executive Order 137691 issued and the legal challenges
against it began, the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality
submitted amicus briefs in cases around the country. In doing this work,
the Center was also mindful that advocacy should not be limited to the
arena of courts, but must also include community organizing to build
coalitions and public education in order to bring about durable change.
The amicus briefs served as a core part of a broader advocacy strategy.
Fortunately, the Korematsu Center was able to draw on its resources,
†

Professor of Law and Executive Director, Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law
and Equality, Seattle University School of Law. I’d like to thank the pro
bono team at Akin Gump for their unflagging dedication to support the
Korematsu Center in its advocacy efforts with regard to the various
iterations of the travel ban. In the first phase of the litigation, this included
pulling together attorneys from its offices around the country on Super Bowl
Sunday to file what would be the first of many amicus briefs on this issue.
Two days earlier, Judge James L. Robart issued a nationwide temporary
restraining order against portions of the travel ban on Feb. 3, 2017,
Washington v. Trump, No. 17-cv-0141 (JLR), and expedited briefing before
the Ninth Circuit required amicus briefs to be filed by midnight on Feb. 5,
2017. This story is told more fully below.

††

Partner, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP. In addition to all of our
Akin Gump colleagues specifically named in the text of this note, I would
like to thank our Supreme Court specialists Pratik A. Shah and Martine
Cicconi; Jessica Weisel of our California appellate group; and Elizabeth
Atkins, Nathaniel Botwinick, Kareen Ejoh, Jorge Guzman, Adria Hicks,
Beth Kasden, Abigail Kohlman, Jennifer Langmack, Harry Larson, Jeff
Mutterperl, Daniella Roseman, Risa Slavin, Sangita Sahasranaman, Steven
Schulman, and James Tysse.
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Partner, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP.
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††††† J.D., Columbia Law School.
1.

Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017).
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including the Civil Rights Clinic at Seattle University School of Law, a
team of pro bono attorneys at Akin Gump, and, as the travel ban challenges progressed, members of the legal teams that had represented
Gordon Hirabayashi, Fred Korematsu, and Minoru Yasui in the successful efforts in the 1980s to overturn the wartime criminal convictions
of those men.2 As the cases progressed, a number of civil rights organizations and bar associations joined the effort.
The final amicus curiae brief reprinted below was the culmination
of more than a year of work in opposition to the Trump Administration’s various iterations of the Muslim travel and refugee ban. Readers
may find it interesting and useful to learn how the coalition developed
and how their work evolved. We begin with that narrative, and then
follow it with the specific advocacy strategy behind the amicus brief.

I. The Story Behind the Amicus Brief
The first sparks of this brief came together soon after President
Donald J. Trump issued the first iteration of the Muslim ban on
January 27, 2017.3 In the travel ban and the legal arguments advanced
by the Department of Justice in support of it, the Korematsu Center
saw echoes of the past, echoes of shameful legal precedents that had
permitted the exclusion of immigrants based on race and nationality
and the mass incarceration of Japanese Americans during World War
II. The government’s invocation of the “plenary power doctrine,” that
the President has “unreviewable authority” in matters of immigration,
has its roots in blatantly racist cases from the late 19th century, such as
Chae Chan Ping v. United States.4 The government’s invocation of
national security to shield the President’s wide-sweeping ban from
2.

Each man’s criminal convictions were upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court.
See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 104 (1943); Yasui v. United
States, 320 U.S. 115, 117 (1943); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,
224 (1944). Decades later, the convictions of Gordon Hirabyashi and Fred
Korematsu were overturned in proceedings seeking a writ of coram nobis.
See Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 608 (9th Cir. 1987);
Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
Minoru Yasui’s conviction was vacated by the U.S. District Court for Oregon
but the court refused to reach Yasui’s constitutional challenge, and during
the pendency of Yasui’s appeal of that decision, Yasui passed away. Yasui
v. United States, 772 F.2d 1496, 1499-1500 (9th Cir. 1985); Minoru Yasui
(1916-1986), The Oregon History Project, https://oregonhistory
project.org/articles/biographies/minoru-yasui-biography/#.WuCQU9Pwb
OQ [https://perma.cc/5SE4-53XA] (last visited Apr. 25, 2018). For a recent
account that examines what led to the overturning of these convictions,
focusing on Korematsu, see Lorraine K. Bannai, Enduring Conviction:
Fred Korematsu and His Quest for Justice (2015).

3.

See Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017).

4.

130 U.S. 581 (1889).
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meaningful judicial scrutiny harkens back to World War II, when the
Supreme Court chose to defer to the Executive branch and the military
with regard to the removal and incarceration of more than 110,000
Japanese Americans from the West Coast states.5 The Korematsu Center contemplated an amicus brief that would remind courts of this
history as part of an effort to keep our country from repeating its mistakes. The Center saw this as an opportunity for a course correction in
our constitutional jurisprudence as it related to immigration and national security.6
Meanwhile, Elizabeth Rosen and Sofie Syed, associates at Akin
Gump, were among the hundreds of lawyers who swarmed John F.
Kennedy International Airport the day after the first Executive Order,
to protest and to volunteer their services to inbound travelers from the
countries named in the order. Syed was mentioned in a Rolling Stone
article published online that weekend. 7 Alice Hsu, a corporate partner
at Akin Gump and a mentor and friend of Syed, called Robert Chang,
the Korematsu Center’s Executive Director, to catch up on news of the
travel ban and the legal challenges that had been filed immediately in
multiple courts, and to tell him that Syed had been featured in Rolling
Stone.8 Hsu had worked for Chang as a research assistant while she was
a law student at Loyola Law School,9 and they had recently reconnected
at a bar association conference. That reconnection led to Hsu—despite
her corporate practice specialty—leading and managing a team of Akin
Gump litigators, including Syed, in writing an amicus curiae brief to

5.

See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).

6.

See generally Robert S. Chang, Whitewashing Precedent: From The Chinese
Exclusion Case to Korematsu to the Muslim Travel Ban Cases, 68 Case
W. Res. L. Rev. 1183 (2018) (discussing immigration exceptionalism and
national security exceptionalism as deformities in U.S. constitutional
jurisprudence).

7.

John Knefel, Inside the Huge JFK Airport Protest Over Trump’s Muslim
Ban, Rolling Stone (Jan. 29, 2017), https://www.rollingstone.com/
politics/features/inside-the-huge-jfk-airport-protest-over-trumps-muslim-banw463615 [https://perma.cc/DSF6-GHG7].

8.

The call also was precipitated by a Google doodle. When Syed told Hsu
about Rolling Stone, it was Monday, January 30, 2017. Hsu went to Google
to look up the article, and noted that the featured Google doodle of the day
was Fred Korematsu, whose birthday is commemorated on that day by
several states and municipalities. Fred Korematsu’s 98th Birthday, Google
(Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.google.com/doodles/fred-korematsus-98thbirthday [https://perma.cc/2VR5-8J8].

9.

Hsu did research for Chang’s first book, Robert Chang, Disoriented:
Asian Americans, Law, and the Nation-State (1999), which included
discussions of the plenary power doctrine and treatment of different Asian
American immigrant groups in U.S. history.
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New York’s high court for the Korematsu Center in 2016.10 That case,
People v. Bridgeforth,11 involved jury selection in which the prosecution
repeatedly struck potential jurors who were dark-skinned women. The
question was whether discrimination in jury selection based on skin
color—as opposed to race—was subject to Batson12 challenges.13 The
amicus brief, in which the Korematsu Center was joined by a host of
civil rights organizations, bar associations, and law professors, was filed
in October 2016, and Hsu was instrumental in assembling the group of
amici. And in late December 2016, the New York Court of Appeals had
ruled that such skin color discrimination in jury selection was impermissible.14 Though the court did not cite directly to the amicus brief in
its opinion, it cited to two studies that the amicus brief brought to the
attention of the court.15
So when Hsu called Chang just a few weeks after the successful
outcome in Bridgeforth to tell him about Syed’s and Rosen’s volunteer
work at JFK, Chang asked if Akin Gump would be interested in working on amicus briefs to be filed in the travel ban cases, and the firm
was quickly retained. Among the litigators who Hsu asked to join the
team was Robert Johnson, a New York commercial litigator who happened to be already admitted to the Eastern District of Michigan—one
of the courts in which plaintiffs challenged the first executive order.
The early strategy was to file amicus briefs in as many district court
challenges as possible,16 and if one of the quickly-moving litigations was

10.

Brief for Amici Curiae Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality et
al. in Support of Defendant-Appellant, People v. Bridgeforth, 69 N.E.3d 611
(2016) (No. 2012-07683) [hereinafter Bridgeforth Brief].

11.

69 N.E.3d 611 (2016).

12.

See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).

13.

Bridgeforth, 69 N.E.3d at 614.

14.

Id.

15.

Id. (citing Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin Color, 49 Duke
L.J. 1487 (2000); Michael Hughes & Bradley R. Hertel, The Significance of
Color Remains: A Study of Life Chances, Mate Selection, and Ethnic
Consciousness Among Black Americans, 68 Soc. Forces 1105 (1990));
Bridgeforth Brief, supra note 10.

16.

Because of the uncertain pace of the various legal proceedings and
uncertainty with regard to outcomes before particular judges or before
particular appellate panels, the legal team thought it important to
participate in as many of the cases as it could. In several cases, especially
the ones involving States as plaintiffs challenging the executive order, many
amicus briefs were filed. In two, the Korematsu Center filed the only amicus
briefs. See Brief of Amici Curiae of the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law
and Equality et al. in Support of Plaintiffs, Arab American Civil Rights
League v. Trump, No. 17-cv-10310 (E.D. Mich. May 18, 2017); Brief of the
Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality et al. as Amici Curiae in
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pending in that district, it would require counsel admitted in that district. The team planned to file motions for admission pro hac vice where
necessary, but with multiple filings to be done in a short period of time,
finding counsel already admitted and ready to join the team was an
advantage.
Over the next four days, while Chang and the Akin Gump team
developed their arguments and began drafting, the travel ban litigation
moved quickly in courts around the country. On Friday evening,
February 3, 2017, Judge James Robart in Seattle issued a temporary
restraining order, nationally enjoining enforcement of the travel ban.17
The government appealed on Saturday, February 4, and filed an emergency motion for a stay pending appeal. That same day, the Ninth
Circuit ordered that the challengers file their opposition papers by
Sunday, February 5, at 11:59 p.m. PST; that the government file its
reply papers by Monday, February 6; and that oral argument would be
held February 7.18 Accordingly, on a Sunday morning conference call,
the Korematsu Center and Akin Gump teams decided that it would be
necessary to finish the brief in a matter of hours and file it before midnight. While much of the nation was absorbed by the Super Bowl that
day, the amicus team was busy finalizing the brief, obtaining consent
of the parties to file the brief, proofreading and cite-checking.19
In rapid succession, the team refined and improved the brief, and
filed it in multiple district courts.20 By mid-February, Jay Hirabayashi,
Support of Plaintiffs, Mohammed v. United States, No. 2:17-cv-00786 (C.D.
Cal. Feb. 8, 2017).
17.

Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash.
Feb 3, 2017).

18.

See Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1158 (9th Cir. 2017).

19.

Brief of the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees and Affirmance, Washington v.
Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 17-35105). A further complication
arose that day when it was realized that the Ninth Circuit’s electronic filing
system is closed for routine maintenance every Sunday evening from 10:00
p.m. until midnight. The Akin Gump team decided to file before 10:00 p.m.
rather than risk a late filing. Mid-day, the Ninth Circuit clerk’s office
apparently realized that the maintenance would interfere with the scheduled
deadline, and an order was entered extending the filing deadline to 1:00 a.m.
Only two amicus briefs were filed before 10:00pm when the electronic filing
system shut down for maintenance. The Korematsu Center amicus brief was
one of them. After midnight and before the 1:00am deadline, many more
amicus briefs were filed.

20.

Brief of the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs, Mohammed v. United States, No. 2:17-cv00786 (C.D. Calif. Feb. 8, 2017); Brief of Amici Curiae by the Fred T.
Korematsu Center for Law and Equality et al. in Support of Plaintiffs, Arab
American Civil Rights League v. Trump, No. 17-cv-10310 (E.D. Mich. Feb.
9, 2017); Brief of the Amici Curiae Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and
Equality et al. in Support of Plaintiffs, Aziz v. Trump, No. 17-cv-116 (E.D.
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Holly Yasui, and Karen Korematsu—the children of Gordon
Hirabayashi, Minoru Yasui, and Fred Korematsu—had signed on as
amici as well. More than a decade before, Hirabayashi, Yasui, and
Korematsu had filed an amicus brief in Turkmen v. Ashcroft,21 challenging the detention of Arab and Muslim men after September 11,
2001, represented by Akin Gump partner Robert H. Pees.22 In Turkmen,
as in the current travel ban litigation, the amici drew parallels between
the U.S. government’s use of executive power to target Japanese Americans during World War II and Muslims after September 11.23
In March, the President issued Executive Order 1378024 (“EO-2”),
superseding the first travel ban, and the process began anew. The amicus team updated its brief and filed again in district courts25 and in the
Fourth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals.26 In June, the government
filed petitions for certiorari in the Supreme Court and applications for
a stay pending appeal; on June 26, 2017, the Supreme Court issued an
order narrowing the scope of the injunctions and granting certiorari.27
The amicus team was now headed to the Supreme Court, with its brief
due in mid-September.
The opportunity for the coram nobis teams—including the individual amici—to file a brief in the Supreme Court was momentous. As
Va. Feb. 9, 2017) Brief of the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and
Equality et al. in Support of the Relief Sought by Petitioners and IntervenorPlaintiff, Darweesh v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-00480, 2017 WL 388504
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2017).
21.

589 F.3d 542 (2d Cir. 2009).

22.

Brief of Karen Korematsu-Haigh et al., Turkmen v. Ashcroft, 589 F.3d 542
(2d Cir. 2009) (Nos. 06–3745–cv(L); 06–3785–cv(Con); 06–3789–cv(Con);
06–3800–cv(Con); 06–4187–cv (XAP)) [hereinafter Turkmen Brief]; see Nina
Bernstein, Relatives of Interned Japanese-Americans Side with Muslims,
N.Y. Times (Apr. 3, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/03/ny
region/03detain.html [https://perma.cc/5H87-Y5EA].

23.

The Turkmen Brief, supra note 22, was filed in 2007 in the Second Circuit;
since then, the case was appealed to the Supreme Court, remanded, and
continues to be litigated on remand to the Eastern District of New York. See
Turkmen v. Ashcroft, Ctr. for Const. Rts., https://ccrjustice.org/ziglarv-abbasi [https://perma.cc/Y2P5-UJHM] (last visited Apr. 26, 2018).

24.

Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017).

25.

Brief of the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs, Hawai’i v. Trump, No. 1:17-CV-0050 (D.
Haw. Mar. 10, 2017); Brief of Amici Curiae of the Fred T. Korematsu Center
for Law and Equality et al. in Support of Plaintiffs, supra note 16.

26.

Amici Brief of the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality et al.,
Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017) (No.
17-1351); Brief of the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality et
al., Hawai’i v. Trump, 871 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 17-15589).

27.

Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017).
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noted above,28 the Hirabayashi, Yasui, and Korematsu decisions of the
Supreme Court in 1943 and 1944 had never been reversed, although
they had been widely condemned. The coram nobis teams decided to
convene an all-hands meeting to discuss exactly what the amicus brief
should say to the court that had upheld the criminal convictions during
World War II. The meeting took place in late July in San Francisco, at
the offices of Minami Tamaki LLP, and Johnson attended on behalf of
Akin Gump. For the coram nobis teams, it was a reunion as well as a
planning session; for Johnson, it was a meaningful opportunity to hear
first-hand about the coram nobis cases and the legal, political,
educational, and artistic work the teams had done over the years to
preserve the legacies of these men and their Supreme Court cases.
Attendees included Holly Yasui, a documentary filmmaker who was
then editing a film about her father;29 Jay Hirabayashi, a dancer and
choreographer who has created works inspired by his father’s
imprisonment;30 and Karen Korematsu, the founder and executive
director of the Korematsu Institute and a frequent speaker on the
Japanese American incarceration.31 Also participating were Peter Irons,
the legal historian who, along with Aiko Herzig-Yoshinaga, discovered
that the government had suppressed and altered evidence during World
War II,32 and Professor Eric Yamamoto, who was busy editing a new
book linking the Japanese American incarceration with the civil liberties issues of today.33 The coram nobis attorneys—many of whom appeared as counsel on the Supreme Court amicus brief—included Dale
Minami, Don Tamaki, Lori Bannai, Peggy Nagae, Bob Rusky, Karen
Kai, Rod Kawakami, and Leigh-Ann Miyasato.

28.

See supra note 2.

29.

See Never Give Up! Minoru Yasui and the Fight for Justice (2017).
For more information about the film, see Never Give Up! Minoru Yasui
and the Fight for Justice, http://www.minoruyasuifilm.org [https://
perma.cc/H7DT-FXK8] (last visited May 9, 2018).

30.

See Kokoro Dance, www.kokoro.ca [https://perma.cc/WC58-MLG9];
Kokoro Dance: Heart, Soul & Spirit, Bulletin (Nov. 1, 2015), http://
jccabulletin-geppo.ca/kokoro-dance-heart-soul-spirit/ [https://perma.cc/K7
34-XHQJ].

31.

See Fred T. Korematsu Inst., http://www.korematsuinstitute.org/home
page/ [https://perma.cc/2YAM-TPDW] (last visited Apr. 30, 2018).

32.

See generally Peter H. Irons, Justice At War: The Story of the
Japanese American Internment Cases (1983); Bannai, supra note 2, at
137–49.

33.

Eric Y. Yamamoto, In the Shadow of Korematsu: Democratic
Liberties and National Security (2018). Yamamoto is also the Fred T.
Korematsu Professor of Law and Social Justice at the Richardson School of
Law, University of Hawai’i.
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After considerable debate and careful drafting, the team proudly
filed the amicus brief in the Supreme Court on September 18, 2017. 34 It
was then rather frustrating when the President issued Proclamation
964535 (“EO-3”) on September 24, superseding EO-2, which led to the
Supreme Court dismissal of the appeal as moot.36 The International
Refugee Assistance Project (“IRAP”) and Hawai’i litigants returned to
their district courts to begin new challenges; at the request of their
counsel, we did not file amicus briefs at the district court level but instead filed when their challenges reached the Fourth and Ninth Circuits,
respectively.37
The brief reprinted here, filed in the Supreme Court on March 30,
2018, was thus the thirteenth iteration of the brief. We added a third
major point, drawing attention to the government’s litigation strategy
today, including its reliance on a memorandum from the Department
of Homeland Security while it “has gone to great lengths to shield that
report from view.”38 We draw parallels between the government’s refusal to produce the report underlying the Proclamation and the suppression of evidence during World War II.39

II. The Broader Advocacy Strategy Behind the Amicus
Brief
The Korematsu Center files amicus briefs with several goals in
mind, the most immediate of which is to have an impact on the litigation. In addition, the Center sees amicus briefs as serving a democratizing function, allowing additional voices to be heard. Amicus briefs
can also involve sign-on strategies that create opportunities for community engagement and coalition building. Finally, amicus briefs can
serve an important educational function.40 The Akin Gump team was
34.

Brief of Karen Korematsu et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents,
Trump v. Hawai’i, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017) (Nos. 16-1436, 16-1540).

35.

Proclamation No. 9645. 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017).

36.

Trump v. Hawai’i, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017).

37.

Amici Brief of Karen Korematsu et al., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v.
Trump, 883 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 2018) (Nos. 17-2231, No. 17-2232, No. 172233, No. 17-2240); Amici Brief of Karen Korematsu et al., Hawai’i v.
Trump, 878 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 17-17168).

38.

See infra at 1256.

39.

Id. at 1257; see also Akin Gump Again Serves as Lead Pro Bono Counsel
on U.S. Supreme Court Amicus Brief in Travel Ban Litigation, Akin Gump
Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Mar. 30, 2018), https://www.
akingump.com/en/news-insights/akin-gump-again-serves-as-lead-pro-bonocounsel-on-u-s-supreme.html [https://perma.cc/Q6YE-QSAH].

40.

For more on the Korematsu Center’s Civil Rights Amicus Project and how
amicus work fits into a broader theory of social change, see Robert S. Chang,
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familiar with the Korematsu Center’s advocacy strategy because of its
previous collaboration in the New York juror discrimination case.41
A.

Litigation Impact

Empirical research on the impact of amicus briefs is limited and
tends to focus on the U.S. Supreme Court.42 Evidence of impact can be
seen most directly if an opinion cites to an amicus brief, adopts an argument it advances that is different from ones advanced by the parties,
or explicitly considers contextual information that it provides. In the
absence of a direct citation, it is difficult to discern whether and in what
way amicus filings are making a difference. However, a recent survey of
federal district and circuit court judges and Supreme Court justices
indicates that amicus briefs are considered seriously by judges and justices and have an impact.43
Scholars typically hypothesize that impact arises based on the “affected groups hypothesis” or the “information hypothesis.” 44 Under the
“affected groups hypothesis,” “amicus briefs are efficacious because they
signal to the Court that a wide variety of outsiders to the suit will be
affected by the Court’s decision.”45 The “information hypothesis” holds
that “amicus briefs are effective, not because they signal how many affected groups will be impacted by the decision, but because they provide
litigants with additional social scientific, legal, or political information
supporting their arguments.”46 The Korematsu Center’s experience and
intuition is that both hypotheses work together in combination, so that
it matters both who is speaking as well as what they have to say.
In the early stages of the travel ban litigation, the parties and
judges did not mention Korematsu or the other Japanese American
WWII incarceration cases. We kept filing amicus briefs in cases around
the country and speaking with reporters, insisting that the wartime
Japanese American incarceration cases were relevant, even if the parties
The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality and Its Vision for
Social Change, 7 Stan. J. C.R. & C.L. 197, 200–07 (2011).
41.

See supra notes 10–15 and accompanying text.

42.

See, e.g., Allison Orr Larsen & Neal Devins, The Amicus Machine, 102 Va.
L. Rev. 1901 (2016); Paul M. Collins, Jr., Friends of the Court: Examining
the Influence of Amicus Curiae Participation in U.S. Supreme Court
Litigation, 38 Law & Soc’y Rev. 807 (2004); Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas
W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court,
148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 743 (2000).

43.

See generally Linda Sandstrom Simard, An Empirical Study of Amici Curiae
in Federal Court: A Fine Balance of Access, Efficiency, and Adversarialism,
27 Rev. Litig. 669 (2008).

44.

Collins, supra note 42, at 808–09.

45.

Id. at 808.

46.

Id.
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were not addressing the cases as such. This changed in the appellate
proceedings with regard to EO-2. In the Fourth Circuit, during the en
banc oral argument, Judge James A. Wynn, Jr., mused aloud about
Korematsu:
[I]f we follow that line of reasoning, would we think differently
about Korematsu now? . . . If you don’t lock them all up, and
something bad happens, oh, then it’s on the President. If you do,
you violate law. If we follow that, is that, does that follow in
every other thing we do? 47

Counsel for IRAP seemed to misunderstand Judge Wynn’s question
and conceded, unnecessarily, that we must defer if the President invokes
a national security rationale and failed to address Korematsu.48
Nevertheless, Korematsu was discussed by Judge Wynn in his concurring opinion.49 In addition, the en banc opinion authored by Chief
Judge Roger L. Gregory noted:
Here and elsewhere, the Government would have us end our
inquiry without scrutinizing either Section 2(c)’s stated purpose
or the Government’s asserted interests, but “unconditional
deference
to
a
government
agent’s
invocation
of
‘emergency’ . . . has a lamentable place in our history,”
Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n of New York v. City of New York,
310 F.3d 43, 53–54 (2d. Cir. 2002) (citing Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 223, 65 S. Ct. 193, 89 L. Ed. 194 (1944)),
and is incompatible with our duty to evaluate the evidence before
us.50

Then, in the Ninth Circuit proceedings on EO-2, Judge Richard A.
Paez mentioned the Korematsu Center amicus brief and asked directly
of Acting Solicitor Jeffrey Wall, “Would the Korematsu executive order
pass muster under your test today?”51 Though Wall did not directly

47.

Oral Argument at 1:50:38 to 1:51:03, Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v.
Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (No. 17-1351), http://
coop.ca4.uscourts.gov/OAarchive/mp3/17-1351-20170508.mp3.

48.

Id.

49.

Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 612, 619 (4th Cir.
2017) (Wynn, J., concurring) (arguing that we have learned from Dred Scott
and Korematsu and rejecting a national security basis founded on actions of
individuals or even groups of individuals then attributed to all persons who
share a particular race, ethnicity, or national origin), vacated as moot, 138
S. Ct. 353 (2017).

50.

Id. at 603.

51.

Oral Argument at 23:55, State of Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662 (9th Cir.
2017) (No. 17-17168), https://www.c-span.org/video/?427827-1/ninth-circuit-
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answer the question, hearing this exchange was a gratifying moment
that made us feel that we had been heard and that the arguments and
contextual information we were providing were being taken seriously
and having an impact.
B.

Democratizing the Courts

Because litigation involving civil rights will often impact many
beyond the immediate parties, seeking to advance or protect civil rights
in the courts is decidedly un- or anti-democratic. Because amicus briefs
allow for non-parties to be heard, amicus briefs can serve an important
democratizing function.52 Our first amicus filing, in the Ninth Circuit,
did not include other amici. But, as noted above, we quickly reached
out to the families of the three men whose cases had reached the Supreme Court during World War II. Though each of the men’s convictions were vacated four decades later, none got the full measure of
relief of having a modern day court assess the constitutionality of the
government’s World War II treatment of Japanese Americans. A representative of each family quickly joined as amici on our briefs. In addition, members of the legal teams who had successfully challenged the
men’s wartime criminal convictions joined the effort, helping to ensure
that the perspectives and voices of the three men and their respective
legacies would be fully represented.
Mindful that other individuals and groups might want to have a
voice in this litigation, the Korematsu Center also reached out to national civil rights organizations and national bar associations of color.
We thought that they would see the travel ban—though primarily
impacting people from several majority-Muslim nations—as an issue
that affects their members and impacts many more communities, especially if disparate treatment on the basis of religion and nationality in
the immigration sphere based on the specter of national security was
legalized or determined to be constitutionally permissible. We found
this to be the case, and soon, we were joined by the following civil rights
organizations and national bar associations of color: Asian Americans
Advancing Justice; Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund;
Hispanic National Bar Association; LatinoJustice PRLDEF; National
Bar Association; National Asian Pacific American Bar Association;
National Native American Bar Association; and South Asian Bar
Association of North America.
These organizations chose to become part of the “who” that was
speaking the “what” in our amicus brief. Their motivations to join likely
hears-oral-argument-travel-ban&live&start=1403 [https://perma.cc/U4UVZCUM].
52.

See generally Robert S. Chang & Karin Wang, Democratizing the Courts:
How an Amicus Brief Helped Organize the Asian American Community to
Support Marriage Equality, 14 Asian Pac. Am. L.J. 22 (2008).
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varied, but their participation was consistent with the Korematsu
Center’s vision about the way in which amicus briefs can serve a democratizing function with regard to the courts.
Who joined as amici was somewhat fluid, with some groups joining
early but then dropping off or drafting and filing their own amicus
briefs.53 In addition, local groups sometimes joined cases in particular
jurisdictions. For example, the Hawaii chapter of the Japanese American Citizens League joined as amicus in Hawaii v. Trump;54 the
Michigan Asian Pacific American Bar Association joined in Arab
American Civil Rights League v. Trump;55 and the Asian American Bar
Association of New York joined in Darweesh v. Trump.56 The sign-on
strategy served the function of democratizing the courts by allowing
amici to have a voice in litigation in which they felt deeply invested in
the outcome.
The sign-on strategy also served the additional goal with regard to
a political dimension that extends beyond the amicus filings as discussed in the next section.
C. Community Engagement and Coalition Building

When the Korematsu Center approached the leaders of civil rights
organizations and national bar associations of color, it did so as part of
its broader strategy of engaging those organizations and their constituencies to build coalitions to facilitate social change. The Korematsu
Center consistently engages in this practice to foster sustaining relationships that persist beyond any particular amicus effort. This also requires
reciprocity so that lawyers and civil rights organizations do not repeat
mistakes made by earlier civil rights lawyers. Gerald Lopez recounts a
story of growing up in East Los Angeles and watching civil rights lawyers come into his community and direct community members about
what the community’s priorities ought to be and what the community
members needed to be doing.57 Instead, durable coalitions require relationships built on respect and reciprocity that fosters trust. The
53.

As the litigation progressed, the National Asian Pacific American Bar
Association began filing its own amicus brief in the travel ban cases, and the
National Native American Bar Association chose to no longer participate as
amicus.

54.

878 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2017), Amici Brief of Karen Korematsu et al., Hawai’i
v. Trump, supra note 37.

55.

No. 2:17-cv-10310 (E.D. Mich. May 18, 2017), Brief of Amici Curiae of the
Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality et al. in Support of
Plaintiffs, supra note 16.

56.

No. 1:17-cv-00480, 2017 WL 388504 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2017); Brief of the
Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality et al. in Support of the
Relief Sought by Petitioners and Intervenor-Plaintiff, supra note 20.

57.

Gerald Lopez, Rebellious Lawyering 1 (1992).

1234

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 4·2018
Stop Repeating History

coalitions fostered in this process can then join together to advocate in
other arenas, whether at the local, state, or federal levels. Amicus briefs
then can be part of the process of deepening civic engagement.
D. Education

At the end of the day, change that is durable comes from education.
The team that came together on this amicus brief launched a public
education campaign entitled “Stop Repeating History! Reject the
Shameful Legacy of Japanese American Incarceration.”58 The campaign
has involved persistent engagement with the press, holding public
events, and distributing information and educational materials through
various social media.
The Akin Gump team has participated in this effort to galvanize
the community as well, through education activities such as panel discussions in connection with film screenings59 and at the Collaborative
Bar Leadership Academy,60 and at the annual conferences of the National Asian Pacific American Bar Association and South Asian Bar
Association of North America; testimony in support of a New York City
resolution creating an annual Fred T. Korematsu Day of Civil Liberties
and the Constitution; and the ceremony observing the inaugural of that
day in New York City in 2018. The Akin Gump team found that these
activities have been tremendously helpful in intergenerational learning
and teaching, and have allowed older and younger lawyers to learn from
each other. We also found that many of the people who attended these
events, or whom Minami and Tamaki contacted for the Stop Repeating
History campaign, would tell us how Minami and Tamaki were inspirational role models for their trailblazing work on the coram nobis cases
and for their balance of private practice and public interest.61
The amicus brief submitted to the Supreme Court has one specific
educational mission with regard to its intended audience of the Court:
58.

Stop Repeating History!: Reject the Shameful Legacy of
Japanese American Incarceration, https://stoprepeatinghistory.org/
[https://perma.cc/Z2AB-3XV4] (last visited Apr. 30, 2018).

59.

And Then They Came for Us, www.thentheycamedoc.com [https://
perma.cc/K2FL-69LQ] (last visited Apr. 30, 2018).

60.

The Collaborative Bar Leadership Academy is a joint initiative of the
American Bar Association, Hispanic National Bar Association, National
Asian Pacific American Bar Association, National Bar Association, National
LGBT Bar Association, and the National Native American Bar Association.
See 2018 Collaborative Bar Leadership Academy, ABA, https://www.
americanbar.org/groups/diversity/DiversityCommission/barleadershipacad
emy.html [https://perma.cc/3WBR-73D9] (last visited Apr. 30, 2018).

61.

See also Minami Tamaki Yamauchi Kwok & Lee Foundation, https:
//mtykl.org [https://perma.cc/7P4D-88ZJ]. The Minami Tamaki Yamuchi
Kwok & Lee Foundation provided funding for the Stop Repeating History!
campaign.
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it is intended to remind the Court to fulfill its “essential role in our democracy by checking unfounded exercises of power.”62 It is intended to
remind the Court of the disaster that occurred when the Court, in 1943
and 1944, failed to fulfill its essential role.63 It is intended to remind the
Court to not repeat the mistakes made by earlier courts.
Readers of the amicus brief can decide for themselves if the lessons
contained in it are worth learning and then decide what it is that they
might do to stop our various institutions from repeating past mistakes.

62.

Infra at 1238.

63.

Cf. Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases: A Disaster, 54 Yale
L.J. 489, 515 (1945).
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Brief of Karen Korematsu, Jay
Hirabayashi, Holly Yasui, the
Fred T. Korematsu Center for
Law and Equality, Civil Rights
Organizations, and National Bar
Associations of Color as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondents
INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE1
Karen Korematsu, Jay Hirabayashi, and Holly Yasui—the children
of Fred Korematsu, Gordon Hirabayashi, and Minoru Yasui—come
forward as amici curiae because they see the disturbing relevance of
this Court’s decisions in their fathers’ infamous cases challenging the
mass removal and incarceration of Japanese Americans during World
War II to the serious questions raised by Presidential Proclamation No.
9645.
Minoru Yasui was a 25-year-old attorney in Portland, Oregon,
when, on March 28, 1942, he intentionally defied the government’s first
actionable order imposing a curfew on persons of Japanese ancestry in
order to challenge the order’s constitutionality. Gordon Hirabayashi
was a 24-year-old college senior in Seattle, Washington, when, on May
16, 1942, he similarly chose to defy the government’s curfew and
removal orders. Fred Korematsu was a 22-year-old welder in Oakland,
California, when, on May 30, 1942, he was arrested for refusing to report
for removal.
All three men brought their constitutional challenges to this Court.
Deferring to the government’s claim that the orders were justified by
military necessity, the Court affirmed their convictions. Our Nation has
since recognized that the mass removal and incarceration of Japanese
Americans was wrong; the three cases have been widely condemned;
1.

This brief is filed with the written consent of all parties. No counsel for any
party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person or entity other
than amici curiae made a monetary contribution intended to fund the brief’s
preparation or submission.
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and all three men have been recognized with the Presidential Medal of
Freedom for their wartime courage and lifetime work advancing civil
and human rights.
Their children have sought to carry forward their fathers’ legacy by
educating the public and, as appropriate, reminding the courts of the
human toll and constitutional harms wrought by governmental actions,
carried out in the name of national security, that impact men, women,
and children belonging to disfavored minority groups. Guilt, loyalty,
and threat are individual attributes. Courts must be vigilant when these
attributes are imputed to entire racial, religious, and/or ethnic groups.
The Hirabayashi, Yasui, and Korematsu cases stand as important
reminders of the need for courts—and especially this Court—to fulfill
their essential role in our democracy by checking unfounded exercises
of executive power.
The Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui families are proud to stand
with the following public interest organizations:
The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality (“Korematsu
Center”) is based at the Seattle University School of Law. Inspired by
the legacy of Fred Korematsu, the Korematsu Center works to advance
justice for all through research, advocacy, and education. The
Korematsu Center has a special interest in addressing government
action targeting classes of persons based on race, nationality, or religion
and in seeking to ensure that courts understand the historical—and, at
times, unjust—underpinnings of arguments asserted to support the
exercise of such executive power. The Korematsu Center does not, here
or otherwise, represent the official views of Seattle University.
Asian Americans Advancing Justice (“Advancing Justice”) is the
national affiliation of five nonpartisan civil rights organizations whose
offices are located in Washington D.C. (AAJC), San Francisco (Asian
Law Caucus), Atlanta, Chicago and Los Angeles. Through direct
services, impact litigation, amicus briefs, policy advocacy, leadership
development, and capacity building, the Advancing Justice affiliates
advocate for marginalized members of the Asian American, Native
Hawaiian, Pacific Islander, and other underserved communities,
including immigrant members of those communities.
The Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund
(“AALDEF”), founded in 1974, is a national organization that protects
and promotes the civil rights of Asian Americans. By combining
litigation, advocacy, education, and organizing, AALDEF works with
Asian American communities nationwide to secure human rights for all.
In 1982, AALDEF supported reparations for Japanese Americans
forcibly relocated and imprisoned during World War II. After 9/11,
AALDEF represented more than 800 individuals from Muslim-majority
countries who were called in to report to immigration authorities under
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the Special Registration program. AALDEF is currently providing
community education and legal counseling to Asian Americans affected
by the challenged Presidential Proclamation.
The Hispanic National Bar Association (“HNBA”) comprises
thousands of Latino lawyers, law professors, law students, legal
professionals, state and federal judges, legislators, and bar affiliates
across the country. The HNBA is committed to advocacy on issues of
importance, including immigration and protection of refugees, to the 53
million people of Hispanic heritage living in the United States.
The Japanese American Citizens League of Hawaii, Honolulu
Chapter (“JACL Honolulu”) draws upon Hawaii’s rich, multiethnic
society and strong cultural values, but broadly focuses on addressing
discrimination and intolerance towards all people victimized by
injustice and prejudice. JACL Honolulu supported redress for Japanese
Americans incarcerated during World War II and sponsors annual
events to educate the public regarding that unjust incarceration, one of
the core reasons for the founding of the JACL Honolulu chapter.
LatinoJustice PRLDEF, Inc. (“LatinoJustice”) is a national civil
rights legal defense fund that has defended the constitutional rights and
equal protection of all Latinos under the law. LatinoJustice’s continuing
mission is to promote the civic participation of the greater pan-Latino
community in the United States, to cultivate Latino community
leaders, and to engage in and support law reform litigation across the
country addressing criminal justice, education, employment, fair
housing, immigrants’ rights, language rights, redistricting, and voting
rights. During its 45-year history, LatinoJustice has litigated numerous
cases in both state and federal courts challenging governmental racial
discrimination.
The National Bar Association (“NBA”) is the largest and oldest
association of predominantly African-American attorneys and judges in
the United States. Founded in 1925 when there were only 1,000 AfricanAmerican attorneys nationwide and when other national bar
associations, such as the ABA, did not admit African-American
attorneys, the NBA today has a membership of approximately 66,000
lawyers, judges, law professors and law students, and has over 75
affiliate chapters. Throughout its history, the NBA consistently has
advocated on behalf of African Americans and other minority
populations regarding issues affecting the legal profession.
The South Asian Bar Association of North America (“SABA”) is
the umbrella organization for 26 regional bar associations in North
America representing the interests of over 6,000 attorneys of South
Asian descent. Providing a vital link for the South Asian community to
the law and legal system, SABA takes an active interest in the legal
rights of South Asian and other minority communities. Members of
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SABA include immigration lawyers and others who represent persons
that have been and will be affected by the Presidential Proclamation.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
“Often the question has been raised whether this country could wage
a new war without the loss of its fundamental liberties at home. Here is
one occasion for this Court to give an unequivocal answer to that
question and show the world that we can fight for democracy and
preserve it too.”
Gordon Hirabayashi made that plea to the Court in 1943, as he
appealed his conviction for violating military orders issued three months
after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Authorized by Executive
Order No. 9066, those orders led to the forced removal and incarceration
of over 120,000 men, women, and children of Japanese descent living
on the West Coast.
Mr. Hirabayashi did not stand alone before this Court. Minoru
Yasui likewise invoked our Nation’s ideals in casting his separate but
related appeal as “the case of all whose parents came to our shores for
a haven of refuge” and insisting that the country should respond to war
and strife “in the American way and not by *** acts of injustice.”
Appellant Br. 55-56, Yasui v. United States, No. 871 (U.S. Apr. 30,
1943). The Court denied the appeals of both men. See Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115
(1943).
The following year, this Court revisited the mass removal and
incarceration of Japanese Americans in Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944). In Korematsu, the Court again failed to stand as
a bulwark against governmental action that undermines core
constitutional principles. By refusing to scrutinize the government’s
claim that its abhorrent treatment of Japanese Americans was justified
by military necessity, the Court enabled the government to cover its
racially discriminatory policies in the cloak of national security.
In this case, the Court is once again asked to abdicate its critical
role in safeguarding fundamental freedoms. Invoking national security,
the government seeks near complete deference to the President’s
decision to deny indefinitely all immigrant and most non-immigrant
visas to nationals of six Muslim-majority countries. See Proclamation
9645, “Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting
Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other PublicSafety Threats,” 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 27, 2017) (“Presidential
Proclamation”).

1240

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 4·2018
Brief of Karen Korematsu, et al. in Support of Respondents

The government claims it is merely asking for the application of
established legal principles, but the extreme deference it seeks is not
rooted in sound constitutional tradition. Rather, it rests on doctrinal
tenets infected with long-repudiated racial and nativist precepts. In
support of the sweeping proposition that the President’s authority to
exclude aliens is unbounded, the government previously invoked the socalled “plenary power” doctrine—that doctrine derives from decisions
such as Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889), which
relied on pejorative racial stereotypes to eschew judicial scrutiny in
upholding a law that prohibited Chinese laborers from returning to the
United States after travel abroad. Id. at 595.
Although no longer using the term “plenary power,” the
government continues to assert that “any policy toward aliens”—
including a decision to exclude an entire class of individuals based on
religion and national origin—is “so exclusively entrusted to the political
branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry
or interference.” Gov’t Br. 23 (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342
U.S. 580, 588-589 (1952)). As the Ninth Circuit observed, the numbing
judicial passivity the government demands “runs contrary to the
fundamental structure of our constitutional democracy” in which “it is
the role of the judiciary to interpret the law, a duty that will sometimes
require the ‘[r]esolution of litigation challenging the constitutional
authority of one of the three branches.’” Washington v. Trump, 847
F.3d 1151, 1161 (9th Cir. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting
Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 196 (2012)).
Even more than the early “plenary power” decisions, the shades of
Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui lurking in the government’s
argument should give this Court pause. In those cases, the government’s
policies were ostensibly backed by the controversial “Final Report”
issued by Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, the military commander
who ordered the mass removal and incarceration of Japanese Americans
on the West Coast. By the time it was finally presented to this Court,
the Final Report—which history revealed to be riddled with falsehoods
about the national security threat posed by Japanese Americans—had
been materially altered to hide the racist motivations of its author.
Here, another report, this time from the Secretary of Homeland
Security, purports to justify the President’s decision to exclude classes
of individuals based on nationality and religion—only this time, the
government has resisted allowing even the courts to review the report.
See Letter to Patricia S. Connor, Clerk of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, from Sharon Swingle, Counsel for
Defendants-Appellants, re: IRAP v. Trump, No. 17-2231 (Nov. 24,
2017) (“Fourth Circuit Letter”). That fact alone should raise alarms.
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Regrettably, however, hidden and suspect government reports are
far from the only similarity between this case and Korematsu,
Hirabayashi, and Yasui. As here, in those cases, the government denied
that its policies were grounded in “invidious *** discrimination” and
asked the Court to take it at its word that “the security of the nation”
justified blanket action against an “entire group *** at once.” Gov’t
Br. 35, Hirabayashi v. United States, No. 870 (U.S. May 8, 1943). In its
now infamous decisions, this Court agreed.
In Hirabayashi, the Court concluded that even though racial
distinctions are “odious to a free people,” it could not “reject as
unfounded the [government’s] judgment” that the measures taken
against Japanese Americans were necessary. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at
99-100. Going further in Korematsu, the Court denied that race played
any role in the government’s decisions: “Cast[ing] this case into outlines
of racial prejudice,” the Court opined, “without reference to the real
military dangers which were presented, merely confuses the issue.” 323
U.S. at 223. Accepting the government’s assurance, the Court went on
to find that “Korematsu was not excluded from the [West Coast]
because of hostility to him or his race[,] [h]e was excluded because ***
the properly constituted military authorities *** decided that the
military urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese
ancestry be segregated *** temporarily.” Id.
Not all members of the Court were convinced, however. Three
Justices dissented, including Justice Murphy, who declared that the
exclusion of Japanese Americans “falls into the ugly abyss of racism,”
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 233, and Justice Jackson, who pointed out that
the Court “had no real evidence” to support the government’s
assertions of military necessity. Moreover, Justice Jackson warned, the
Court had created “a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any
authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.”
Id. at 246.
As history has made us acutely aware, the dissenters’ doubts as to
the veracity of the government’s assertion of military necessity were
well-founded, and their recognition of the gravity of the Court’s decision
was prophetic. Four decades after the Court upheld their convictions,
Gordon Hirabayashi, Minoru Yasui, and Fred Korematsu successfully
sought to have them vacated in unprecedented coram nobis
proceedings. Evidence presented in those cases showed that the
“military urgency” on which this Court predicated its decision (and the
purported justification asserted in General DeWitt’s Final Report) was
nothing more than a smokescreen: The real reason for the government’s
deplorable treatment of Japanese Americans was not acts of espionage,
but rather a baseless perception of disloyalty grounded in racial
stereotypes.
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With the benefit of hindsight, Korematsu (and by inference
Hirabayashi and Yasui) “stands as a constant caution that in times of
war or declared military necessity our institutions must be vigilant in
protecting constitutional guarantees” and “national security must not
be used to protect governmental actions from close scrutiny and
accountability.” Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1420
(N.D. Cal. 1984). Put simply, those cases “illustrate[] that it can be
highly destructive of civil liberties to understand the Constitution as
giving the President a blank check.” Stephen Breyer, The Court
and the World: American Law and the New Global
Realities 84 (2015).
Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui are as wrong today as they
were on the day they were decided. If it were to accept the government’s
invitation here to abdicate its judicial responsibility, the Court would
repeat its failures in those widely condemned cases. The Court should
instead take this opportunity to acknowledge the historic wrong in
Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui, and to repudiate its refusal to
scrutinize the government’s claim of necessity and its consequent failure
to recognize the military orders’ racist underpinnings. Heeding the
lessons of history, the Court should subject the President’s decision to
meaningful judicial scrutiny and affirm the Founders’ visionary
principle that an independent and vigilant judiciary is a foundational
element of a healthy democracy.

ARGUMENT
I. The Government’s Conception of Plenary Power Derives from Cases
Infected with Racist and Xenophobic Prejudices.

In defending the first Executive Order that sought to exclude aliens
from Muslim-majority countries, the government argued that “political
branches[] [have] plenary constitutional authority over foreign affairs,
national security, and immigration.” Gov’t Emergency Mot. 15-16,
Washington v. Trump, No. 17-35105 (9th Cir. Feb. 4, 2017). In light of
that “plenary authority,” the government asserted, “[j]udicial secondguessing of the President’s determination that a temporary suspension
of entry of certain classes of aliens was necessary *** to protect national
security *** constitute[s] an impermissible intrusion.” Id. at 15.
Despite shedding the “plenary power” label, the government’s
central argument remains unchanged: The political branches’ “power
to *** exclude aliens” is “largely immune from judicial control.” Gov’t
Br. 18 (ellipsis in original) (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792
(1977)). This Court, however, has never recognized an unbridled
“plenary” power in the immigration realm that would preclude judicial
review. And to the extent that it has shown excessive deference to the

1243

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 4·2018
Brief of Karen Korematsu, et al. in Support of Respondents

political branches in some cases, those precedents are linked to racist
attitudes from a past era that have long since fallen out of favor.
1. In Chae Chan Ping v. United States, known as The Chinese
Exclusion Case, the Court upheld a statute barring the return of
Chinese laborers who had departed the United States prior to its
passage. 130 U.S. at 581-582. Describing the reasons underlying the
law’s enactment, the Court characterized Chinese laborers as “content
with the simplest fare, such as would not suffice for our laborers and
artisans,” and observed that they remained “strangers in the land,
residing apart by themselves, *** adhering to the customs and usages
of their own country,” and unable “to assimilate with our people.” Id.
at 595. “The differences of race added greatly to the difficulties of the
situation.” Id. Residents of the West Coast, the Court explained,
warned of an “Oriental invasion” and “saw or believed they saw ***
great danger that at no distant day *** [the West] would be overrun
by them, unless prompt action was taken to restrict their immigration.”
Id.
Far from applying a skeptical eye to the law in light of the clear
animus motivating its passage, the Court found that “[i]f *** the
government of the United States, through its legislative department,
considers the presence of foreigners of a different race in this country,
who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and
security *** its determination is conclusive upon the judiciary.” The
Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 606; see also Natsu Taylor Saito,
The Enduring Effect of the Chinese Exclusion Cases: The “Plenary
Power” Justification for On-Going Abuses of Human Rights, 10 Asian
L.J. 13, 15 (2003). In reality, the “right of self-preservation” that the
Court validated as justification for the government’s unbounded power
to exclude immigrants was ethnic and racial self-preservation, not the
preservation of borders or national security. 130 U.S. at 608; see id. at
606 (“It matters not in what form *** aggression and encroachment
come, whether from the foreign nation acting in its national character,
or from vast hordes of its people crowding in upon us.”).
Similar racist and xenophobic attitudes are evident in decisions
following The Chinese Exclusion Case. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 729-730 (1893) (upholding requirement
that Chinese resident aliens offer “at least one credible white witness”
in order to remain in the country); id. at 730 (noting Congress’s belief
that testimony from Chinese witnesses could not be credited because of
“the loose notions entertained by the witnesses of the obligation of an
oath” (quoting The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 598)).
2. Even in its early plenary power decisions, however, the Court
recognized that the government’s sovereign authority is subject to
constitutional limitations. See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at
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604 (“[S]overeign powers *** [are] restricted in their exercise only by
the constitution itself and considerations of public policy and justice
which control, more or less, the conduct of all civilized nations.”).
Indeed, from the doctrine’s inception, the Court divided over the reach
of the government’s power in light of those limitations.
Fong Yue Ting, which upheld a law requiring Chinese laborers
residing in the United States to obtain a special certificate of residence
to avoid deportation, generated three dissenting opinions. See 149 U.S.
at 738 (Brewer, J., dissenting) (“I deny that there is any arbitrary and
unrestrained power to banish residents, even resident aliens.”); id. at
744 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 761 (Fuller, J., dissenting). Even
Justice Field, who authored the Court’s opinion in The Chinese
Exclusion Case, sought to limit the plenary power doctrine’s application
with regard to alien residents:
As men having our common humanity, they are protected by all
the guaranties of the constitution. To hold that they are subject
to any different law, or are less protected in any particular, than
other persons, is *** to ignore the teachings of our history ***
and the language of our constitution.

Id. at 754.
Nearly 60 years later, judicial skepticism regarding an unrestrained
plenary power persisted—and proliferated. In Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952), the Court, relying on Korematsu (see
note 2, infra), upheld a provision permitting the deportation of resident
aliens who were members of the Communist Party. In dissent, Justice
Douglas quoted Justice Brewer’s words in Fong Yue Ting, observing
that they “grow[] in power with the passing years”:
This doctrine of powers inherent in sovereignty is one both
indefinite and dangerous. *** The governments of other nations
have elastic powers. Ours are fixed and bounded by a written
constitution. The expulsion of a race may be within the inherent
powers of a despotism. History, before the adoption of this
constitution, was not destitute of examples of the exercise of such
a power; and its framers were familiar with history, and wisely,
as it seems to me, they gave to this government no general power
to banish.

Id. at 599-600.
In another McCarthy-era precedent, four Justices advocated for
limitations on the plenary power doctrine. In Shaughnessy v. United
States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953), the Court rejected any
constitutional challenge to the exclusion of an alien who had previously
resided in the United States, despite his resulting indefinite detention

1245

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 4·2018
Brief of Karen Korematsu, et al. in Support of Respondents

at Ellis Island. In dissent, Justice Black, joined by Justice Douglas,
reasoned that “[n]o society is free where government makes one person’s
liberty depend upon the arbitrary will of another.” Id. at 217.
“Dictatorships,” he observed, “have done this since time immemorial.
They do now.” Id. Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Frankfurter, added
that such aliens must be “accorded procedural due process of law.” Id.
at 224.
3. Perhaps reflecting the shift away from the xenophobic and racebased characterizations prevalent in its early plenary power precedents,
the Court in recent years has been more willing to enforce constitutional
limitations on the government’s authority over immigration matters.
In Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993), for example, the Court held
that INS regulations must at least “rationally advanc[e] some legitimate
governmental purpose.” Id. at 306. In Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21
(1982), the Court affirmed that a resident alien returning from a brief
trip abroad must be afforded due process in an exclusion proceeding.
Id. at 33. And in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), in response
to the government’s contention that “Congress has ‘plenary power’ to
create immigration law, and *** the Judicial Branch must defer to
Executive and Legislative Branch decisionmaking in that area,” the
Court observed that such “power is subject to important constitutional
limitations.” Id. at 695 (citations omitted). “[F]ocus[ing] upon those
limitations,” id., the Court determined that the indefinite detention of
aliens deemed removable would raise “serious constitutional concerns”
and accordingly construed the statute at issue to avoid those problems,
id. at 682. See generally Washington, 847 F.3d at 1162-1163 (collecting
cases demonstrating reviewability of federal government action in
immigration and national security matters).
The Court’s most recent decision in this area provides further
support for the conclusion that, after more than a century of erosion,
the notion of plenary power over immigration is little more than a relic.
In Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015), this Court considered a
due process claim arising from the denial without adequate explanation
of a spouse’s visa application. Although it described the power of the
political branches over immigration as “plenary,” Justice Kennedy’s
concurring opinion in Din made clear that courts may review an exercise
of that power. Id. at 2139-2140. Justice Kennedy acknowledged that
the Court in Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), had declined
to balance the constitutional rights of American citizens injured by a
visa denial against “Congress’ ‘plenary power to make rules for the
admission of aliens and to exclude those who possess those
characteristics which Congress has forbidden.’” Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2139
(quoting Mandel, 408 U.S. at 766). But he explained that the Court did
inquire “whether the Government had provided a ‘facially legitimate
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and bona fide’ reason for its action.” Id. at 2140 (quoting Mandel, 408
U.S. at 770). And while as a general matter courts are not to “look
behind” the government’s asserted reason, courts should do so if the
challenger has made “an affirmative showing of bad faith.” Id. at 2141.
To be sure, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Din acknowledged that
the political branches are entitled to wide latitude and deference in
immigration matters. For that reason, the government relies heavily on
Din and Mandel to argue that its assertion of a national security
rationale is sufficient to justify the Presidential Proclamation and to
preclude further judicial scrutiny. See Gov’t Br. at 58-64. But, as the
Ninth Circuit has recognized, Din (and Mandel before it) concerned an
individual visa denial on the facts of that case. Washington, 847 F.3d
at 1163-1164. By contrast, the Proclamation sets a nationwide
immigration policy of denying all immigrant and most non-immigrant
visas to aliens of certain nationalities. While it may be sensible for
courts ordinarily to defer to the judgment of the political branches when
considering the application of immigration law to a particular alien, the
President’s decision to issue a broadly applicable immigration policy—
especially one aimed at nationals of particular countries likely to share
a common religion—is properly the subject of more searching judicial
review. See id.
All told, modern judicial precedent supports the notion that courts
have both the power and the responsibility to review Presidential
Proclamation 9645. Where, as here, the Court is asked to review a farreaching program—promulgated at the highest level of the Executive
Branch and targeting aliens based on nationality and religion—
precedent and common sense demand more than an assessment of
whether the government has offered a “facially legitimate and bona
fide” rationale for its policy. Rather, this policy, both on its face and in
light of the glaring clues as to its motivations, cries out for careful
judicial scrutiny.
II. Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui Stand as Stark Reminders of the
Need for Searching Judicial Review when the Government Targets
Disfavored Minorities in the Name of National Security.

This Court need not look far for a reminder of the constitutional
costs and human suffering that flow from the Judiciary’s failure to rein
in sweeping governmental action against disfavored minorities. And it
need not look far for a reminder of the Executive Branch’s use of
national security as a pretext to discriminate against such groups. The
Court need look only to its own precedents—its all but universally
condemned wartime decisions in Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui.
1. On February 19, 1942, President Roosevelt issued Executive
Order No. 9066, authorizing the Secretary of War to designate “military
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areas” from which “any or all persons” could be excluded and “with
respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave”
would be subject to “whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the
appropriate Military Commander may impose.” Exec. Order No. 9066,
“Authorizing the Secretary of War to Prescribe Military Areas,” 7 Fed.
Reg. 1407, 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942). Adding its imprimatur to the
Executive Order, Congress made violation of any restrictions issued
thereunder a federal offense. An Act of March 21, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77503, 56 Stat. 173.
Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, head of the Western Defense
Command, used that authority to issue a series of proclamations that
led to the removal and incarceration of all individuals of Japanese
ancestry living in “Military Area No. 1”—an exclusion area covering
the entire Pacific Coast. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 89. A curfew order
came first. Soon after, Japanese Americans were ordered to abandon
their homes and communities on the West Coast for tarpaper barracks
(euphemistically called “relocation centers”) surrounded by barbed wire
and machine gun towers in desolate areas inland. Id. at 90.
For different individual reasons, but sharing a deep sense of justice,
Minoru Yasui, Gordon Hirabayashi, and Fred Korematsu refused to
comply with General DeWitt’s orders. Yasui, a young lawyer, regarded
the curfew as an affront to American constitutional values. “To make
it a crime for me to do the same thing as any non-Japanese person ***
solely on the basis of ancestry,” he explained, “was, in my opinion, an
absolutely abominable concept and wholly unacceptable.” Testimony of
Minoru Yasui, Nat’l Comm. for Redress, Japanese Am. Citizens League
9, Comm’n on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (1981).
“Our law and our basic concept of justice had always been founded
upon the fundamental principle that no person should be punished but
for that individual’s act, and not because of one’s ancestry.” Id. at 10.
Convinced of the curfew’s illegality, Yasui immediately defied it in
order to initiate a constitutional challenge.
Hirabayashi, a student at the University of Washington, also
defied the orders so that he could challenge their constitutionality,
saying that he “considered it [his] duty to maintain the democratic
standards for which this nation lives.” Peter Irons, Justice at
War: The Story of the Japanese American Internment
Cases 88 (1984).
Korematsu, a welder living in Oakland, CA, refused to obey the
removal orders so that he could remain with his fiancée who was not
subject to removal because she was not Japanese American. The last of
the three to face arrest and prosecution, Korematsu “shared with Yasui
and Hirabayashi an equal devotion to constitutional principle” and
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believed that the statute under which he was convicted was wrong. Id.
at 98.
2. The constitutional challenges Yasui, Hirabayashi, and
Korematsu made to the military orders soon made their way to this
Court. But far from fulfilling its essential role in the constitutional
structure that entrusts the Judiciary with the protection of
fundamental rights, the Court set upon a path of judicial abdication
that today serves as a cautionary tale.
In Hirabayashi’s case, the Court elected to consider only his
conviction for violating the curfew order, leaving unanswered his
challenge to his conviction for failing to report to a Civil Control
Station—a precursor to removal from his home in Seattle. Hirabayashi,
320 U.S. at 85. Harkening back to The Chinese Exclusion Case, the
Court repeated the government’s claim that “social, economic and
political conditions” “intensified the[] solidarity” of Japanese Americans
and “prevented their assimilation as an integral part of the white
population.” Id. at 96. Betraying no skepticism of these premises, the
Court found that, in view of these and other attributes of the “isolation”
of Japanese Americans and their “relatively little social intercourse ***
[with] the white population,” “Congress and the Executive could
reasonably have concluded that these conditions *** encouraged the
continued attachment of members of this group to Japan and Japanese
institutions.” Id. at 98. “Whatever views we may entertain regarding
the loyalty to this country of the citizens of Japanese ancestry,” the
Court continued, “we cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the
military authorities and of Congress that there were disloyal members
of that population, whose number and strength could not be precisely
and quickly ascertained.” Id. at 99.
Having upheld the curfew in Hirabayashi, the Court issued only a
short opinion remanding Yasui’s case to the Ninth Circuit. Yasui, 320
U.S. at 115. Because the district court had imposed a sentence based
on its determination that Yasui had renounced his American
citizenship, and the government did not defend that finding, the Court
remanded the matter for resentencing. Id. at 117. The Court thereby
avoided addressing the district court’s conclusion, supported by
extensive analysis, that the military orders were unconstitutional as
applied to citizens. See United States v. Yasui, 48 F. Supp. 40, 44-54
(D. Or. 1942).
The Court’s third opportunity to confront the mass removal and
incarceration program came a year-and-a-half later, in Korematsu’s
case. The Court again narrowed the issues before it, rejecting
Korematsu’s argument that the removal order could not be extricated
from the incarceration he would inevitably face if he complied with that
order. 323 U.S. at 216. Then, despite affirming that racial distinctions
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are “immediately suspect” and “must [be] subject *** to the most rigid
scrutiny,” id., the Court denied, without probing examination, that the
military orders were driven by racial hostility. The Court reiterated its
conclusion from Hirabayashi that it would not substitute its judgment
for that of the military authorities. “There was evidence of disloyalty
on the part of some,” the Court reasoned, and “the military authorities
considered that the need for action was great, and time was short. We
cannot—by availing ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight—
now say that at that time these actions were unjustified.” Id. at 223224.
When the Court decided Korematsu, however, three members
rejected the government’s arguments. In vigorous dissents, Justices
Murphy and Jackson sharply questioned the validity of the military
justification the government advanced. Although acknowledging that
the discretion of those entrusted with national security matters “must,
as a matter of *** common sense, be wide,” Justice Murphy declared
that “it is essential that there be definite limits to military discretion”
and that individuals not be “left impoverished of their constitutional
rights on a plea of military necessity that has neither substance nor
support.” 323 U.S. at 234. In his view, the exclusion order “clearly d[id]
not meet th[is] test” as it relied “for its reasonableness upon the
assumption that all persons of Japanese ancestry may have a dangerous
tendency to commit sabotage and espionage.” Id. at 234-235 (emphasis
added). In fact, as Justice Murphy noted, intelligence investigations
found no evidence of Japanese American sabotage or espionage. Id. at
241. And even if “there were some disloyal persons of Japanese descent
on the Pacific Coast,” Justice Murphy reasoned, “to infer that examples
of individual disloyalty prove group disloyalty and justify
discriminatory action against the entire group” is nothing more than
“th[e] legalization of racism.” Id. at 240-241, 242.
Justice Jackson was equally dubious of the factual basis for the
government’s claim that the military orders were justified. The
government never submitted General DeWitt’s Final Report to the
lower courts. Although the report was eventually presented to this
Court, by then it was too late for development of record evidence to
challenge the report or counter its assertions. Those facts were not lost
on Justice Jackson, who viewed the report with skepticism. “How does
the Court know,” he asked, “that these orders have a reasonable basis
in necessity?” 323 U.S. at 245. Pointing out that “[n]o evidence
whatever on that subject ha[d] been taken by this or any other court”
and that the Final Report was the subject of “sharp controversy as to
[its] credibility,” Justice Jackson observed that the Court had “no real
evidence before it” and thus “ha[d] no choice but to accept General
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DeWitt’s own unsworn, self-serving statement, untested by any crossexamination, that what he did was reasonable.” Id.
Justice Jackson saw grave dangers in the Court’s opinion. While an
unconstitutional military order is short-lived, he observed, “once a
judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms to
the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that
the Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has
validated the principle of racial discrimination in criminal procedure
and of transplanting American citizens.” 323 U.S. at 246. With that,
Justice Jackson issued a prophetic warning: By “validat[ing] the
principle of racial discrimination in criminal procedure and of
transplanting American citizens,” the Court had created “a loaded
weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a
plausible claim of an urgent need.” Id.2
3. The dissenters’ fears proved to be well-founded. Decades after
this Court’s decisions in Hirabayashi, Yasui, and Korematsu, newly
discovered government records revealed not only that intelligence
reports and data contradicted the claim that the mass removal and
incarceration program was justified by military necessity, but also that
the government knew as much when it convinced the Court to affirm
the defendants’ convictions.3
In 1983, armed with those newly discovered records, Yasui,
Hirabayashi, and Korematsu filed coram nobis petitions seeking to
vacate their convictions. As the court found in the Hirabayashi case,
government records showed that General DeWitt’s Final Report had
been materially altered in order to fabricate an acceptable factual
justification for the mass removal and incarceration program.
Hirabayashi v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 1445, 1456-1457 (W.D.
2.

Justice Jackson’s usage of Korematsu and Hirabayashi as precedent in
Harisiades (see p. 16, supra), on which the government relies (Gov’t Br. 18),
brought this warning to life. In Harisiades, a noncitizen claimed that due
process protected his liberties in the same way it does the rights of citizens.
But Korematsu and Hirabayashi, Justice Jackson wrote, show that even
citizens are unprotected from far-reaching government claims of national
security. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 591 & n.17 (“When citizens raised the
Constitution as a shield against expulsion from their homes and places of
business, the Court refused to find hardship a cause for judicial
intervention.”). Constrained by stare decisis, Justice Jackson applied
Korematsu as standing precedent to reject Harisiades’ constitutional claim.
That application to the specific facts in Harisiades extended Korematsu’s
principle of extreme deference to “new purposes”—precisely the danger
Justice Jackson predicted in his “loaded weapon” warning. 323 U.S. at 246.

3.

Those records are discussed at length in Justice at War: The Story of the
Japanese American Internment Cases by Peter Irons, supra, who, along with
Aiko Herzig-Yoshinaga, unearthed them.
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Wash. 1986). Although the version of the report presented to this Court
stated that it was impossible to identify potentially disloyal Japanese
Americans in the time available, a prior printed version—submitted to
the War Department while the government’s briefs in Hirabayashi and
Yasui were being finalized—made clear that the decision to issue the
challenged orders had nothing to do with urgency. Rather, General
Dewitt’s decision turned on his view that Japanese Americans were
inherently disloyal on account of their “ties of race, intense feeling of
filial piety and *** strong bonds of common tradition, culture and
customs.” Id. at 1449. “It was not that there was insufficient time in
which to make such a determination” the original report stated; “a
positive determination could not be made [because] an exact separation
of the ‘sheep and the goats’ was unfeasible.” Id. (quoting Lieutenant
General John L. DeWitt, Final Report: Japanese Evacuation from the
West Coast ch. 2 (1942)).
Beyond exposing the racist underpinnings of General DeWitt’s
orders (as well as the pretextual nature of the claim of urgency), the
coram nobis cases revealed that the government possessed information
rebutting the assertion in the DeWitt Report that Japanese Americans
were involved in sabotage and espionage. Hirabayashi v. United States,
828 F.2d 591, 601 (9th Cir. 1987). The Office of Naval Intelligence
(“ONI”), which the President charged with monitoring West Coast
Japanese American communities, had determined in its official report
that Japanese Americans were overwhelmingly loyal and posed no
security risk. ONI thus recommended handling any potential disloyalty
on an individual, not group, basis. ONI found, contrary to the
government’s representation to this Court, that mass incarceration was
unnecessary, as “individual determinations could be made
expeditiously.” Id. at 602 n.11 (emphasis added); see also Irons, supra,
at 203. In addition, reports from the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(“FBI”) and Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) directly
refuted claims in the DeWitt Report that Japanese Americans were
engaged in shore-to-ship signaling, intimating Japanese American
espionage. Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1417. Indeed, FBI Director
Hoover wrote to Attorney General Biddle shortly before President
Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066 that the push for mass racial
handling was based on politics rather than facts. Memorandum from J.
Edgar Hoover, Dir. FBI to Francis Biddle, Att’y Gen. (Feb. 2, 1942).
Department of Justice attorney John Burling, co-author of the
government’s brief, sought to alert the Court of the FBI and FCC
intelligence that directly refuted the DeWitt Report. Burling included
in his brief a crucial footnote that read: “The recital [in General
DeWitt’s report] of the circumstances justifying the evacuation as a
matter of military necessity *** is in several respects, particularly with
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reference to the use of illegal radio transmitters and to shore-to-ship
signaling by persons of Japanese ancestry, in conflict with information
in the possession of the Department of Justice.” Korematsu, 584 F.
Supp. at 1417 (emphasis and citation omitted). But high-level Justice
Department lawyers stopped the brief’s printing. Despite Burling’s
vociferous protest about the DeWitt Report’s “intentional falsehoods,”
id. at 1418, the footnote was diluted to near incoherence, even implying
the opposite of Burling’s intended message. As revised, the footnote
stated:
[The DeWitt Report] is relied on in this brief for statistics and
other details concerning the actual evacuation and the events that
took place subsequent thereto. We have specifically recited in this
brief the facts relating to the justification for the evacuation, of
which we ask the Court to take judicial notice, and we rely upon
the Final Report only to the extent that it relates to such facts.

Gov’t Br. 11 n.2, Korematsu v. United States, No. 22 (U.S. Oct. 5,
1944). Notwithstanding an earlier warning from Justice Department
lawyer Edward Ennis that failing to alert the Court to the contrary
intelligence in DOJ’s possession “might approximate the suppression of
evidence,” Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d at 602 n.11 (citation omitted), the
Justice Department concealed from the Court this material evidence on
military necessity.
In light of the evidence presented, the courts hearing Fred
Korematsu and Gordon Hirabayashi’s coram nobis cases concluded that
the government’s misconduct had effected “a manifest injustice” and
that the mass removal and incarceration program had been validated
based on unfounded charges of treason. Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at
1417; Hirabayashi, 627 F. Supp. at 1447.4 In granting Korematsu’s
coram nobis petition, Judge Patel articulated the modern significance
of the wartime cases:
Korematsu *** stands as a constant caution that in times of war
or declared military necessity our institutions must be vigilant in
protecting constitutional guarantees. It stands as a caution that
in times of distress the shield of military necessity and national
security must not be used to protect governmental actions from
close scrutiny and accountability. It stands as a caution that in
times of international hostility and antagonisms our institutions,
legislative, executive and judicial, must be prepared to exercise
4.

In Minoru Yasui’s coram nobis case, the court acceded to the government’s
request to vacate his conviction and dismiss his petition for relief without
making any determinations regarding government misconduct—and without
acknowledging the injustice he suffered.
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their authority to protect all citizens from the petty fears and
prejudices that are so easily aroused.

Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1420.
In vacating Korematsu, Yasui, and Hirabayashi’s convictions, the
coram nobis courts joined other governmental institutions in
recognizing the wrongs committed against Japanese Americans during
World War II. In 1976, President Ford officially rescinded Executive
Order 9066, explaining that “[w]e now know what we should have
known then—not only was *** evacuation wrong, but JapaneseAmericans were and are loyal Americans.” Presidential Proclamation
4417, “An American Promise,” 41 Fed. Reg. 7714 (Feb. 19, 1976). The
Executive Branch also recognized the contributions of the three men
who challenged the military orders. Each one received the Presidential
Medal of Freedom, the nation’s highest civilian honor: Fred Korematsu
in 1998, Gordon Hirabayashi in 2012, and Minoru Yasui in 2015.
In 1983, after extensive hearings and research, the congressionally
authorized Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of
Civilians (CWRIC) issued a report concluding that it was not “military
necessity” that underpinned the mass removal and incarceration
program, but rather “race prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of
political leadership.” Report of CWRIC, Personal Justice
Denied 459 (The Civil Liberties Public Education Fund & University
of Washington Press, 1997). Five years later, Congress passed (and
President Reagan signed) the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, which, on the
CWRIC’s recommendations, acknowledged the injustice of the removal
and incarceration program, issued an official apology, and conferred
symbolic reparations to the survivors of the incarceration centers.
Most recently, in 2011, the Acting Solicitor General confirmed what
the coram nobis cases had established decades earlier: This Court’s
wartime decisions were predicated on lies. “By the time the cases of
Gordon Hirabayashi and Fred Korematsu reached the Supreme Court,
[DOJ] had learned of a key intelligence report that undermined the
rationale behind the internment. *** But the Solicitor General did not
inform the Court of the report despite warnings *** that failing to alert
the Court ‘might approximate the suppression of evidence.’ Instead, he
argued that it was impossible to segregate loyal Japanese Americans
from disloyal ones.” U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Confession of Error: The
Solicitor General’s Mistakes During the Japanese-American Internment
Cases (May 20, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/blog/confessionerror-solicitor-generals-mistakes-during-japanese-american-internmentcases.
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III. The Government’s Litigation Strategy in this Case Demands this
Court’s Vigilance.

The government’s arguments in this case bear a disturbing
similarity to the arguments this Court accepted in Korematsu,
Hirabayashi, and Yasui. Defending the military orders in Hirabayashi,
the government told this Court:
The classification was not based upon invidious race
discrimination. Rather, it was founded upon the fact that the
group as a whole contained an unknown number of persons who
could not readily be singled out and who were a threat to the
security of the nation; and in order to impose effective restraints
upon them it was necessary not only to deal with the entire group,
but to deal with it at once. Certainly, it cannot be said that such
a conclusion was beyond the honest judgment, reasonably
exercised, of those whose duty it was to protect the Pacific Coast
against attack.

Gov’t Br. 35, Hirabayashi v. United States, supra (emphasis added).
Here, the government similarly implores the Court to accept the
rationale offered and not to look behind the four corners of the
Presidential Proclamation to ascertain whether the policy is motivated
by discriminatory animus. “The Proclamation,” the government argues,
“is explicitly premised on facially legitimate purposes: protecting
national security and the national interest by preventing entry of
persons about whom the United States lacks sufficient information to
assess the risk they pose[.] *** The Proclamation thus amply establishes
a ‘facially legitimate and bona fide reason’ for its restrictions.’” Gov’t
Br. 60 (quoting Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770).
Decades after Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui, however, the
national security justification the government offered for its wartime
policies was proven false and the real reasons for the military orders—
baseless concerns about disloyalty grounded in racial stereotypes—were
exposed. The government has offered no basis to believe that similar
revelations about the President’s decision to exclude individuals from
Muslim-majority countries will not one day come to light. To the
contrary, the government’s representations and litigation strategy in
this case only exacerbate that grave concern.
First, although the government claims that it conducted a
“worldwide review” to arrive at the decision to deny all immigrant and
most non-immigrant visas to designated classes, the Proclamation’s text
offers reason to doubt that the review actually supports the policy. The
Proclamation indicates that its non-immigrant visa restrictions are “in
accordance with the recommendations of the Secretary of Homeland
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Security” based on the worldwide review. Presidential Proclamation,
§ 1(h)(iii). Notably, the Proclamation does not make the same claim
with respect to the immigrant visa restrictions. See id. at § 1(h)(ii).
The government’s references to the worldwide review in its brief are
similarly delicate. See Gov’t Br. 9-10.
Second, despite the purported centrality of the worldwide review
and corresponding report by the Secretary of Homeland Security, the
government has gone to great lengths to shield that report from view.
The government has resisted providing the report to the courts even
for in camera inspection and has urged the courts not to “consider [its]
contents” should they decide, over the government’s objections, to
review the report. See Notice of In Camera Ex Parte Lodging of Report
Containing Classified Information and Objection to Review or
Consideration of Report at 4, State of Hawaii v. Trump et al., No. 17cv-0050-DKW-KSC, ECF No. 376 (D. Haw. Oct. 13, 2017); Fourth
Circuit Letter, supra. The government has also aggressively fought
efforts to release the report publicly, arguing that it is protected from
disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) by the
presidential communications privilege. See, e.g., Brennan Center for
Justice v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 17-cv-7520 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 2,
2017).5
Third, echoing the findings in the ONI, FBI and FCC reports
suppressed in the wartime cases, the limited documents that have come
to light pertaining to the President’s exclusion decision undermine
rather than affirm the purported national security justification for the
ban. Following the first Executive Order suspending the entry of aliens
from Muslim-majority nations, the Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”) drafted a report assessing the likelihood that visitors and
immigrants from those countries would commit acts of terrorism in the
United States. The report concluded that “citizens of countries affected
by E.O. 13769 [were] rarely implicated in US-based terrorism” and “few
of the impacted countries have terrorist groups that threaten the
West.” Acting Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, DHS, Citizenship
Likely an Unreliable Indicator of Terrorist Threat to the United States
(Feb.
2017)
(capitalization
removed),
5.

In FOIA litigation, the government has released indexes describing the
contents of the pages it continues to withhold. Those indexes indicate that
the appendices for the reports on the “worldwide” review are only a few
pages long. See Letter to Judge Paul Gardephe from AUSA Christopher
Connolly, Brennan Center for Justice v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 17-cv-7520
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2018), ECF No. 31. Because the reports’ appendices
supposedly provide detail as to why the targeted countries’ vetting systems
are inadequate, the paltry page count offers additional reason for skepticism
that the reports provide a sufficient justification for the President’s policy.
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https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3474730/DHSintelligence-document-on-President-Donald.pdf. In other words, little
more than six months before the Secretary of Homeland Security
produced a report that purports to justify the visa-denial policy, the
Department concluded that the very individuals affected were unlikely
to pose a threat to the United States if permitted to enter.
Parallels to the government’s actions in the wartime cases have not
been lost on the lower courts. Before enjoining the President’s
Proclamation, the District Court of Maryland asked the government:
“How is this different than Korematsu where [the United States] relied
on an executive order by the President and many years after the fact
it was determined that there was information within the Justice
Department that contradicted representations made to the Court”?
Prelim. Inj. Hr’g Tr. at 50, Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, et al. v.
Trump, et al., No. 17-cv-00361-TDC (D. Md. Oct. 16, 2017), ECF No.
217. Even when confronted with that direct question, the government
refused to assure the court that the DHS report entirely supports the
policies contained in the Proclamation. See id. at 51 (“Your Honor, I’m
not going to speak to the contents of the report.”). Indeed, the
government disclaimed any obligation to tell the court whether advisors
to the President disagreed that his exclusion decision was necessary.
See id. at 52 (“I do not think we either have the obligation or should
be asked about whether there were disagreements among presidential
advisors in the report and whether—what one describes as an
inconsistency of what one agency thought or what another agency
thought.”).
The government’s refusal to produce the report underlying the
Proclamation, or even to assure the courts that its contents do not
undermine the President’s policy, offers ample reason for skepticism
that the decision to exclude certain classes was based on a credible
assessment of the national security threat those individuals pose. The
dubious nature of the government’s asserted justification raises the
question whether, like in Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui, the
decision was motivated by more nefarious considerations.
*

*

*

During World War II, this Court’s refusal to probe the
government’s claim that military necessity justified the mass removal
and incarceration of Japanese Americans made it unwittingly complicit
in the government’s deception. The Court’s blank-check treatment of
the Executive Branch’s wartime policies—underscored by its repeated
refusal to confront the most grievous aspects of those policies or to
acknowledge their racist underpinnings—allowed the wrongs inflicted
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on Japanese Americans to continue unabated for years, and allowed the
government to avoid accountability for its egregious misconduct for
decades.
Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui are powerful reminders not
only of the need for constant vigilance in protecting our fundamental
values, but also of the essential role of the courts as a check on abuses
of government power, especially during times of national and
international stress. Rather than repeat the failures of the past, this
Court should repudiate them and affirm the greater legacy of those
cases: Blind deference to the Executive Branch, even in areas in which
decision-makers must wield wide discretion, is incompatible with the
protection of fundamental freedoms. Meaningful judicial review is an
essential element of a healthy democracy.
Consistent with those principles, this Court should reject the
government’s invitation to abdicate its critical role in our constitutional
system, subject the President’s exclusion decision to searching judicial
scrutiny, and stand—as Gordon Hirabayashi, Minoru Yasui, and Fred
Korematsu did—as a bulwark against governmental action that
undermines core constitutional values.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the decisions
below.
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